Difference between revisions of ".MTczOA.MjAzMzA"
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the Senate necessarily involves the exclusive right to determine what deficiencies exist and who are the constitutional candidates to supply them. The question of election and that of non election are correlative propositions and cannot be separated To support that one tribunal can determine one, and another tribunal determine the other, would be grossly absurd. | the Senate necessarily involves the exclusive right to determine what deficiencies exist and who are the constitutional candidates to supply them. The question of election and that of non election are correlative propositions and cannot be separated To support that one tribunal can determine one, and another tribunal determine the other, would be grossly absurd. | ||
again, in determining who are constitutional candidates to supply deficiencies, it is necessary to judge of the returns, certificates and other evidence of elections in the primary meetings of the people, and also of the eligibility of the persons voted for. This is judging of the elections and qualifications of members. and if the House and Senate, or a part of the members of each, undertake to decide who are the constitutional candidates to supply deficiencies in the Senate, and elect from the candidates so ascertained, the House will exercise a controlling power in judging of the elections and qualifications of members of the Senate; which is against the positive and express provisions of the constitution. | again, in determining who are constitutional candidates to supply deficiencies, it is necessary to judge of the returns, certificates and other evidence of elections in the primary meetings of the people, and also of the eligibility of the persons voted for. This is judging of the elections and qualifications of members. and if the House and Senate, or a part of the members of each, undertake to decide who are the constitutional candidates to supply deficiencies in the Senate, and elect from the candidates so ascertained, the House will exercise a controlling power in judging of the elections and qualifications of members of the Senate; which is against the positive and express provisions of the constitution. | ||
| − | 2nd Because it cannot be seriously contended that a convention of the two Houses, or of any portion of the members of the two Houses, cane be constitutionally formed, concept after a proposition for that purpose by one House and a concurrence in such proposition by the other. If therefore the House of Representatives proceed, without the concurrence of a majority of the Senate, to supply deficiencies by election, it will still be a House of Representatives and not a constitutional convention: and the persons elected can derive from such election, none of the rights of Senators. | + | 2nd Because it cannot be seriously contended that a convention of the two Houses, or of any portion of the members of the two Houses, cane be constitutionally formed, concept after a proposition for that purpose by one House and a concurrence in such proposition by the other. If therefore the House of Representatives proceed, without the concurrence of a majority of the Senate, to supply deficiencies by election, it will still be a House of Representatives and not a constitutional convention: and the persons elected can derive from such election, none of the rights of Senators. |
| + | These views and this construction | ||
Revision as of 20:42, 14 September 2020
230
the Senate necessarily involves the exclusive right to determine what deficiencies exist and who are the constitutional candidates to supply them. The question of election and that of non election are correlative propositions and cannot be separated To support that one tribunal can determine one, and another tribunal determine the other, would be grossly absurd. again, in determining who are constitutional candidates to supply deficiencies, it is necessary to judge of the returns, certificates and other evidence of elections in the primary meetings of the people, and also of the eligibility of the persons voted for. This is judging of the elections and qualifications of members. and if the House and Senate, or a part of the members of each, undertake to decide who are the constitutional candidates to supply deficiencies in the Senate, and elect from the candidates so ascertained, the House will exercise a controlling power in judging of the elections and qualifications of members of the Senate; which is against the positive and express provisions of the constitution. 2nd Because it cannot be seriously contended that a convention of the two Houses, or of any portion of the members of the two Houses, cane be constitutionally formed, concept after a proposition for that purpose by one House and a concurrence in such proposition by the other. If therefore the House of Representatives proceed, without the concurrence of a majority of the Senate, to supply deficiencies by election, it will still be a House of Representatives and not a constitutional convention: and the persons elected can derive from such election, none of the rights of Senators. These views and this construction