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might be rendered navigable with boats quite or nearly to their sources; our schools and seminaries of learning, whose prosperity and usefulness might be much advanced by additional encouragement; all conclusively demonstrate the immense benefits that would arise to this State from liberal appropriations for the promotion of education, and works of public utility.
 
might be rendered navigable with boats quite or nearly to their sources; our schools and seminaries of learning, whose prosperity and usefulness might be much advanced by additional encouragement; all conclusively demonstrate the immense benefits that would arise to this State from liberal appropriations for the promotion of education, and works of public utility.
The mode adopted by the general government in the appropriation heretofore made for works of this kind, exclusion of the doubt existing as to the constitutional power, has been attended to with difficulties, and is liable to many objections. More than five millions of dollars have been already appropriated by Congress for this purpose, and other works, the costs of which are estimated at nearly a hundred million more, have been proposed or contemplated. It cannot be denied that these works in general are more for the interests of particular sections of the country than for the general benefit of the nation. And it is difficult to perceive the justice of this system of partial appropriation, which in effect takes from the common fund the property belonging to the people of one part of the Union, and without their consent, bestows it upon another. By an equitable apportionment of the fund amongst the several States, these objections would be obviated; and it is believed that much would also be gained by entrusting the states with the expenditures of the appropriations. For the general government cannot be presumed to possess the means of correctly determining the relative utility of a public work, or of conducting its execution with the greatest economy and to the general satisfaction of the people, in an equal degree with the legislature of the State within whose territory such improvements are contemplated. Besides the present mode of making the appropriations by Congress, without an established and uniform system, opens the door for the practice of local partialities, and dangerous combinations among the representatives from different sections of the Union, and will unless experience deceives us, become a fruitful
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The mode adopted by the general government in the appropriation heretofore made for works of this kind, exclusion of the doubts existing as to the constitutional power, has been attended with difficulties, and is liable to many objections. More than five millions of dollars have been already appropriated by Congress for this purpose, and other works, the costs of which are estimated at nearly a hundred millions more, have been proposed or contemplated. It cannot be denied that these works in general are more for the interests of particular sections of the country than, than for the general benefit of the nation. And it is difficult to perceive the justice of this system of partial appropriation, which in effect takes from the common fund the property belonging to the people of one part of the Union and without their consent, bestows it upon another. By an equitable apportionment of the fund among the several States, these objections would be obviated; and it is believed that much would also be gained by entrusting the states with the expenditures of the appropriations. For the general government cannot be presumed to possess the means in many cases of correctly determining the relative utility of a public work, or of conducting its execution with the greatest economy and to the general satisfaction of the people, in an equal degree with the legislature of the State within whose territory such improvements are contemplated. Besides the present mode of making the appropriations by Congress, without an established and uniform system, opens the door for the practice of local partialities, and dangerous combinations among the representatives from different sections of the Union, and will unless experience deceives us, become a fruitful

Latest revision as of 14:56, 26 March 2021

354

might be rendered navigable with boats quite or nearly to their sources; our schools and seminaries of learning, whose prosperity and usefulness might be much advanced by additional encouragement; all conclusively demonstrate the immense benefits that would arise to this State from liberal appropriations for the promotion of education, and works of public utility.

The mode adopted by the general government in the appropriation heretofore made for works of this kind, exclusion of the doubts existing as to the constitutional power, has been attended with difficulties, and is liable to many objections. More than five millions of dollars have been already appropriated by Congress for this purpose, and other works, the costs of which are estimated at nearly a hundred millions more, have been proposed or contemplated. It cannot be denied that these works in general are more for the interests of particular sections of the country than, than for the general benefit of the nation. And it is difficult to perceive the justice of this system of partial appropriation, which in effect takes from the common fund the property belonging to the people of one part of the Union and without their consent, bestows it upon another. By an equitable apportionment of the fund among the several States, these objections would be obviated; and it is believed that much would also be gained by entrusting the states with the expenditures of the appropriations. For the general government cannot be presumed to possess the means in many cases of correctly determining the relative utility of a public work, or of conducting its execution with the greatest economy and to the general satisfaction of the people, in an equal degree with the legislature of the State within whose territory such improvements are contemplated. Besides the present mode of making the appropriations by Congress, without an established and uniform system, opens the door for the practice of local partialities, and dangerous combinations among the representatives from different sections of the Union, and will unless experience deceives us, become a fruitful