Difference between revisions of ".MTczOA.MjAzMzQ"
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Because the Senate had not fully exercised its constitutional right and power in judging of its elections, ascertaining deficiencies and determining who were the constitutional candidates to supply them. And | Because the Senate had not fully exercised its constitutional right and power in judging of its elections, ascertaining deficiencies and determining who were the constitutional candidates to supply them. And | ||
| − | Because therefore the choice of the said Appleton, Usher & Bodwell by that convention was wholly unconstitutional, void and | + | Because therefore the choice of the said Appleton, Usher & Bodwell by that convention was wholly unconstitutional, void and of no effect whatever, and gave them some of the rights or privileges of Senators. |
It is most manifest that the Senate must first fully judge of the elections & qualifications of its members, by adjudging who are elected, what deficiencies exist and who are the candidates from whom those deficiencies should be supplied, before a convention can proceed to supply such deficiencies. In ascertaining the candidates the Senate necessarily judges of the elections by the people and of the qualifications of the persons voted for, in respect to their eligibility. To suppose the Senate could exercise this power twice, once before and again after the deficiencies are supplied, would be absurd. Its whole power, then, in this respect, being fully exercised before the deficiencies are supplied, it follows that none can be exercised afterwards; and therefore no vote, order or resolve can legalize such convention or any of its doings relating to its elections. No subsequent resolve of either House can make a conventional act constitutional, which in itself is unconstitutional; for if it could, a resolve of either House would be paramount in power to the constitution itself. | It is most manifest that the Senate must first fully judge of the elections & qualifications of its members, by adjudging who are elected, what deficiencies exist and who are the candidates from whom those deficiencies should be supplied, before a convention can proceed to supply such deficiencies. In ascertaining the candidates the Senate necessarily judges of the elections by the people and of the qualifications of the persons voted for, in respect to their eligibility. To suppose the Senate could exercise this power twice, once before and again after the deficiencies are supplied, would be absurd. Its whole power, then, in this respect, being fully exercised before the deficiencies are supplied, it follows that none can be exercised afterwards; and therefore no vote, order or resolve can legalize such convention or any of its doings relating to its elections. No subsequent resolve of either House can make a conventional act constitutional, which in itself is unconstitutional; for if it could, a resolve of either House would be paramount in power to the constitution itself. | ||
| − | It is a self evident proposition that an act the due performance of which requires the concurrence of the two Houses in joint ballot, cannot, when illegally done, be legalized by a vote of either House alone. If it were otherwise, either House would have the power of both Houses together. Each House may judge of the elections by the people, | + | It is a self evident proposition that an act the due performance of which requires the concurrence of the two Houses in joint ballot, cannot, when illegally done, be legalized by a vote of either House alone. If it were otherwise, either House would have the power of both Houses together. Each House may judge of the elections by the people, of its members and of the qualifications of the persons voted for, But neither have the power to elect, except jointly in convention of both Houses. Neither can therefore by its own act render |
Revision as of 17:44, 1 June 2021
234 Because the Senate had not fully exercised its constitutional right and power in judging of its elections, ascertaining deficiencies and determining who were the constitutional candidates to supply them. And Because therefore the choice of the said Appleton, Usher & Bodwell by that convention was wholly unconstitutional, void and of no effect whatever, and gave them some of the rights or privileges of Senators. It is most manifest that the Senate must first fully judge of the elections & qualifications of its members, by adjudging who are elected, what deficiencies exist and who are the candidates from whom those deficiencies should be supplied, before a convention can proceed to supply such deficiencies. In ascertaining the candidates the Senate necessarily judges of the elections by the people and of the qualifications of the persons voted for, in respect to their eligibility. To suppose the Senate could exercise this power twice, once before and again after the deficiencies are supplied, would be absurd. Its whole power, then, in this respect, being fully exercised before the deficiencies are supplied, it follows that none can be exercised afterwards; and therefore no vote, order or resolve can legalize such convention or any of its doings relating to its elections. No subsequent resolve of either House can make a conventional act constitutional, which in itself is unconstitutional; for if it could, a resolve of either House would be paramount in power to the constitution itself. It is a self evident proposition that an act the due performance of which requires the concurrence of the two Houses in joint ballot, cannot, when illegally done, be legalized by a vote of either House alone. If it were otherwise, either House would have the power of both Houses together. Each House may judge of the elections by the people, of its members and of the qualifications of the persons voted for, But neither have the power to elect, except jointly in convention of both Houses. Neither can therefore by its own act render