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− | XIV the Senate should be an independent and coordinate Branch of the Legislature, and not, in any respect, or in any manner subordinate to the House of Representatives: that It should alone possess the power of Judging of the "Elections" and "Qualifications" of its own Members, and, by consequence, of determining the number of Senators elected by the People, the number of Senators not so elected and deficient: the Persons voted for, in each District, where deficiencies may be found to exist, and the highest numbers of the Persons so voted for and not elected equal to twice the number of Senators deficient, in every District, if so many, and also of designating the Candidates, from whom such deficiencies meey and must be Constitutionally supplied, by a Joint ballot of the Members of the House of Representatives and such Senators as shall have been elected by the People: this being necessarily implied in the Power "to judge of the Elections and Qualifications of its own Members,: in as much as any other Branch of the Government, assuming to determine any of the above questions, must assume to exercise a power which is vested in the Senate alone; and such exercise of power by the House of Representatives, in relation to the "Elections" and "Qualifications" of the members of the Senate, would be as unwarranted by the Constitution and as absurd in practice as would be an attempt on the part of the Senate to judge of, and determine upon, the "Elections" and Qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives, which is, by the Constitution, made the exclusive right and duty of that House: and, because it is not the meaning and was not the intention of the | + | XIV the Senate should be an independent and coordinate Branch of the Legislature, and not, in any respect, or in any manner subordinate to the House of Representatives: that It should alone possess the power of Judging of the "Elections" and "Qualifications" of its own Members, and, by consequence, of determining the number of Senators elected by the People, the number of Senators not so elected and deficient: the Persons voted for, in each District, where deficiencies may be found to exist, and the highest numbers of the Persons so voted for and not elected equal to twice the number of Senators deficient, in every District, if so many, and also of designating the Candidates, from whom such deficiencies meey and must be Constitutionally supplied, by a Joint ballot of the Members of the House of Representatives and such Senators as shall have been elected by the People: this being necessarily implied in the Power "to judge of the Elections and Qualifications of its own Members,: in as much as any other Branch of the Government, assuming to determine any of the above questions, must assume to exercise a power which is vested in the Senate alone; and such exercise of power by the House of Representatives, in relation to the "Elections" and "Qualifications" of the members of the Senate, would be as unwarranted by the Constitution and as absurd in practice as would be an attempt on the part of the Senate to judge of, and determine upon, the "Elections" and Qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives, which is, by the Constitution, made the exclusive right and duty of that House: and, because it is not the meaning and was not the intention of the Frames of the Constitution, by providing for the election of Senators deficient, in and by a Convention of the Members of the House of Representatives and such Senators as shall have been elected by the People, to confer on the Members of the House of Representatives any other or greater power in such election, than to give to them the right of voting for any of such Persons to fill deficiencies as the Senate shall have previously determined, by an adjudication upon the votes returned, to be Constitutional Candidates from whom |
Revision as of 06:04, 10 October 2020
XIV the Senate should be an independent and coordinate Branch of the Legislature, and not, in any respect, or in any manner subordinate to the House of Representatives: that It should alone possess the power of Judging of the "Elections" and "Qualifications" of its own Members, and, by consequence, of determining the number of Senators elected by the People, the number of Senators not so elected and deficient: the Persons voted for, in each District, where deficiencies may be found to exist, and the highest numbers of the Persons so voted for and not elected equal to twice the number of Senators deficient, in every District, if so many, and also of designating the Candidates, from whom such deficiencies meey and must be Constitutionally supplied, by a Joint ballot of the Members of the House of Representatives and such Senators as shall have been elected by the People: this being necessarily implied in the Power "to judge of the Elections and Qualifications of its own Members,: in as much as any other Branch of the Government, assuming to determine any of the above questions, must assume to exercise a power which is vested in the Senate alone; and such exercise of power by the House of Representatives, in relation to the "Elections" and "Qualifications" of the members of the Senate, would be as unwarranted by the Constitution and as absurd in practice as would be an attempt on the part of the Senate to judge of, and determine upon, the "Elections" and Qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives, which is, by the Constitution, made the exclusive right and duty of that House: and, because it is not the meaning and was not the intention of the Frames of the Constitution, by providing for the election of Senators deficient, in and by a Convention of the Members of the House of Representatives and such Senators as shall have been elected by the People, to confer on the Members of the House of Representatives any other or greater power in such election, than to give to them the right of voting for any of such Persons to fill deficiencies as the Senate shall have previously determined, by an adjudication upon the votes returned, to be Constitutional Candidates from whom