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Portland February 15. 1822.

To the Governor of Maine,

Sir

Your Letter of the 7th instant, addressed to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial court has been received, in which you request their opinion on the following question, viz. “Is the office of Agent under the Resolve of the sixth instant, Authorizing the Governor to appoint one or more Agents for the preservation of Timber on the public lands and for other purposes, a civil office of profit under this State, within the meaning of part 3rd of Article 4th Section 10th of the Constitution, so that no Senator or Representative of the present Legislature can constitutionally be appointed as Agent.”

We have examined the subject with as much attention as was in our power, and consulted Judge Weston and obtained the benefit of his opinion which agrees with our own; and which is now respectfully submitted in compliance with your request. By the Constitution of this State the Sovereign Power resides in three distinct Departments, Viz, the Legislative, Executive and Judicial; and in the second Section of the third article of the Declaration of Rights it is declared that, “no person or persons belonging to one of these Departments, shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed and permitted.” With this provision in view, it seems proper to give such a construction of the Constitution, as will be necessary to effect the object contemplated, which was to preserve the powers abovementioned entirely distinct, except in the cases specified: And we deem in incorrect to extend the construction any farther than to affect such object; because in a Republican Government like ours, the qualifications for offices, either those depending on the suffrages of the people or the appointment of the Executive, ought not to be taken away or limited by more implication. On this principle and by this rule of construction the incompatibilities mentioned or alleged to exist in different parts of the Constitution should be examined and understood: On a careful view of those Sections in which the term “Office” or “Offices” is used, it will be found from the connection in which it stands, to have reference to

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