.MTc4NA.MjE5OTY

VII

heretofore made for works of this kind, exclusive of the doubts existing as to the constitutional power, has been attended with difficulties, and is liable to many objections. More than five millions of Dollars have been already appropriated by Congress for this purpose, and other works, the costs of which are estimated at nearly a hundred millions more, have been proposed or contemplated. It cannot be denied that these works in general are more for the interests of particular sections of country, than for the general benefit of the nation. And it is difficult to perceive the Justice of this system of partial appropriation, which in effect takes from the common fund the property belonging to the people of one part of the Union, and without their consent bestows it upon another. By an equitable apportionment of the fund among the several States these objections would be obviated, and it is beleived [believed] that much would also be gained by entrusting the States with the expenditure of the appropriations. For the general Government cannot be presumed to possess the means in many cases of correctly determining the relative utility of a public work, or of conducting its execution with the greatest economy, and to the general satisfaction of the people, in an equal degree with the Legislature of the State within whose territory such improvements are contemplated. Besides the present mode of making the appropriations by Congress, without an established and uniform system, opens the door for the practice of local partialities, and dangerous combinations among the representatives from different sections of the Union, and will unless experience deceives us, become a fruitful source of collision and jealousy between the several states, which the prudent and patriotic should dread, and earnestly seek to avoid, as they would every evil that may threaten in any degree, to