Hovmandbuur2050

Wagner's fully elaborated theory of learning (e.g., Vogel, Ponce, & Wagner, 2019) was founded on an initial analysis of the mechanisms responsible for habituation (Wagner, 1976, 1979). Central to its explanation of long-term habituation was the proposal that a predicted stimulus, one signaled by some other event as a consequence of associative learning, would be less effective at activating its central representation. We review evidence (from studies of the role of context in habituation and latent inhibition, of preexposure to the event to be used as an unconditioned stimulus in conditioning, and of conditioned diminution effects) taken to support this explanation. We argue that the evidence is less than convincing and consider instead an alternative account that interprets habituation as reflecting a reduction in the effective salience of a stimulus that is determined by a learning process akin to extinction, in which the critical factor is that the stimulus is presented followed by no consequences. The application of this account to the phenomena dealt with by Wagner's model is considered and further implications are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).We report 2 eye-tracking experiments with human variants of 2 rodent recognition memory tasks, relative recency and object-in-place. In Experiment 1 participants were sequentially exposed to 2 images, A then B, presented on a computer display. When subsequently tested with both images, participants biased looking toward the first-presented image A the relative recency effect. When contextual stimuli x and y, respectively, accompanied A and B in the exposure phase (xA, yB), the recency effect was greater when y was present at test, than when x was present. In Experiment 2 participants viewed 2 identical presentations of a 4-image array, ABCD, followed by a test with the same array, but in which one of the pairs of stimuli exchanged position (BACD or ABDC). Participants looked preferentially at the displaced stimulus pair the object-in-place effect. Three further conditions replicated Experiment 1's findings 2 pairs of images were presented one after the other (AB followed by CD); on a test with AB and CD, relative recency was again evident as preferential looking at AB. Moreover, this effect was greater when the positions of the first-presented A and B were exchanged between exposure and test (BACD), compared with when the positions of second-presented C and D were exchanged (ABDC). The results were interpreted within the theoretical framework of the Sometime Opponent Process model of associative learning (Wagner, 1981). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).When a cue is established as a reliable predictor of an outcome (A-O1), this cue will typically block learning between an additional cue and the same outcome if both cues are subsequently trained together (AB-O1). Three experiments sought to explore whether this effect extends to outcomes and was investigated using the food allergist paradigm in human participants. In all 3 experiments, an outcome facilitation effect was observed. That is, prior learning about an element of an outcome compound (A-O1) facilitated learning about a novel outcome when (A-O2) these outcomes were presented together (A-O1 O2) relative to a control stimulus that first received C-O3 trials prior to C-O1 O2 trials. In Experiment 2, however, participants were also presented with an additional set of control trials, which were presented during Stage II only and reliably predicted the outcome compounds. At test, participants displayed more learning about these additional control trials relative to the blocked outcomes, thus displaying an outcome blocking effect alongside an outcome facilitation effect. In Experiment 3, a one-trial outcome blocking procedure was used to distinguish theoretical accounts of these findings. This procedure revealed an outcome facilitation effect but not an outcome blocking effect. These results can be understood in terms of an account derived from Wagner's (1981) model. The implications of these findings are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).In 2 experiments, participants received a predictive learning task in which the presence of 1 or 2 food items signaled the onset or absence of stomachache in a hypothetical patient. Their task was to identify the cues that signaled the occurrence, or nonoccurrence of this ailment. The 2 groups in Experiment 1 and the single group in Experiment 2 received a blocking treatment, where Cue A and a combination of Cues A and X both signaled stomachache, A+ AX+. These groups also received a simple discrimination where the outcome was signaled by one compound but not another, BY+ CY-. Subsequent test trials revealed the so-called redundancy effect, where X was regarded as a more reliable predictor of the outcome than Y. This result occurred when the trials with A+ preceded those with AX+ (Group E, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2), and when the trials with A+ and AX+ were intermixed (Group C, Experiment 1). The results challenge theories based on the assumption that cues presented together must compete for a limited pool of associative strength. LY3023414 ic50 Rather, they are said to support theories that assume changes in attention determine what is learned when two or more cues are presented together. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).When humans make biased or suboptimal choices, they are often attributed to complex cognitive processes that are viewed as being uniquely human. Alternatively, several phenomena, such as suboptimal gambling behavior and cognitive dissonance (justification of effort) may be explained more simply as examples of the contrast between what is expected and what occurs as well as Wagner's Standard Operating Procedure model based on reward prediction error. For example, when pigeons are attracted to choices involving a suboptimal, low probability of a high payoff, as in unskilled gambling behavior, it may be attributed to reward prediction error or the contrast between the low probability of reward expected and the sometimes high probability of reward obtained (when one wins). Similarly, justification of effort, the tendency to attribute greater value to rewards that are difficult to obtain, is typically explained in terms of the tendency to inflate the value of a reward to justify the effort required to obtain it. When pigeons prefer outcomes that require more effort to obtain, however, it is more likely to be explained in terms of contrast between the effort and the reward that follows.